A verifiable rule before effect
Identities and capabilities are evaluated against a signed SecurityPolicy. The deterministic engine can allow, constrain, require review, or deny an action.
Elyne Corp / agentic system security
The agent proposes. EAS checks permissions, decides before an action takes effect, and keeps the evidence.
A local control plane for AI agents: identities, capabilities, signed policy, controlled execution, and a verifiable audit trail. Elyne Red Unified is included to challenge the system within an authorized scope.
Architecture
This animation shows five successive states: the agent alone, exposed flows, then EAS, Cyber, and OS confinement. Each stage lasts five seconds; the final view remains on screen.
Controls
EAS connects decisions, execution, and evidence. Models may analyze or propose; the operator's policy defines what is allowed.
Identities and capabilities are evaluated against a signed SecurityPolicy. The deterministic engine can allow, constrain, require review, or deny an action.
The ToolBroker checks tool requests and parameters. Connected sensitive actions pass through EAS authorization before execution.
For processes that EAS launches and manages, a signed profile can impose an AppContainer identity and limited OS permissions.
Decisions and events are stored in a chained ledger. Qualification correlates receipts, observed effects, and system state.
Deployment
EAS can first mediate actions from an existing agent, then add an OS boundary when EAS launches and manages that agent's process.
The agent keeps its existing execution model. EAS decides and audits actions that pass through its interfaces; other paths must be connected or restricted by the environment.
EAS starts a process specified by a signed policy in a restricted Windows context. Lab work observed OS-level denials and checked the identity of a child process.
Validation
Tests on a Windows clone correlate a request, EAS's decision, the observed denial, and the associated records. Evidence remains tied to the version tested.
A confined probe attempted to access a protected canary. Windows denied the request and the canary's integrity was checked.
A connection attempt from the confined process was denied, with a positive control to distinguish confinement from a network fault.
A child retained its AppContainer token, and its termination was checked when EAS stopped the managed process.
After the tests, the lab checked the state of EAS and Elyne Cyber and verified the ledger.
Evidence scope: separate tests on the Windows clone, documented in qualifications R43, R44, R45, and R48. Full confinement of a third-party agent still requires qualification of its integration and permissions.
Adversarial validation
The defense is accompanied by a way to challenge it. Red runs authorized scenarios and records observations so a campaign can be replayed after each change. Elyne Lab Director can orchestrate and consolidate these evaluations.
Explore the three productsAvailability
Windows R45 is available for a guided technical evaluation. The Linux port remains in laboratory qualification. Integration starts with the capabilities and resources that need protection.